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Abstract—A performance of the pseudo-random method for the
radar detection is analyzed. The radar sends a pseudo-random
sequence of length N , and receives echo from r targets. We assume
the natural assumptions of uniformity on the channel and of the
square root cancellation on the noise. Then for r ≤ N1−δ , where
δ > 0, the following holds: (i) the probability of detection goes to
one, and (ii) the expected number of false targets goes to zero, as N
goes to infinity.
I. INTRODUCTION
A RADAR is designed to estimate the location and velocity ofobjects in the surrounding space. The radar performs sensing
by analyzing correlations between sent and received (analog)
signals. In this note we describe the digital radar, i.e. we assume
that the radar sends and receives finite sequences. The reduction
to digital setting can be carried out in practice, see for example
[1], and [5].
Throughout this note we denote by ZN the set of integers
{0, 1, ..., N−1} equipped with addition and multiplication modulo
N . We denote by H = C(ZN ) the vector space of complex valued
functions on ZN equipped with the standard inner product 〈·, ·〉,
and refer to it as the Hilbert space of sequences. We use the
notation Sr−1C to denote the unit complex sphere in Cr:
Sr−1C = {(z1, . . . , zr) ∈ Cr |
r∑
k=1
|zk|2 = 1}.
A. Model of Digital Radar
We describe the discrete radar model which was derived in [1].
We assume that a radar sends a sequence S ∈ H and receives as
an echo a sequence R ∈ H. The relationship between S, and R
is given by the following equation:
R[n] = H(S)[n] +W[n], n ∈ ZN , (I-A.1)
where H , called the channel operator, is defined by1
H(S)[n] =
r∑
k=1
αke(ωkn)S[n− τk], n ∈ ZN , (I-A.2)
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1We denote e(t) = exp(2piit/N).
with αk’s the complex-valued attenuation coefficients associated
with target k, ‖~α‖2 = ∑k |αk|2 = 1, τk ∈ ZN the time shift
associated with target k, ωk ∈ ZN the frequency shift associated
with target k, and W denotes a random noise. The parameter
r will be called the sparsity of the channel. The time-frequency
shifts (τk, ωk) are related to the location and velocity of target
k. We denote the plane ZN ×ZN of all time-frequency shifts by
V . We denote by P the probability measure on the sample space
generated by the random noise and attenuation coefficients.
Remark I-A.1: Let us elaborate on the constraint ‖~α‖ = 1. In
reality ‖~α‖ ≤ 1. However, we can rescale the received sequence
R to make ‖~α‖ = 1. The rescaling will not change the quality of
the detection, as evident from Section II-C.
We make the following assumption on the distribution of W:
Assumption (Square root cancellation): For every ε > 0, there
exists c > 0, such that for any N2 vectors u1, . . . , uN2 ∈ SN−1C
we have
P
(
|〈W, uj〉| ≤ N− 12+ε, j = 1, 2, . . . , N2
)
≥ 1− e−cN .
Note that an additive white gaussian noise (AWGN) of a
constant, i.e., independent of N , signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
satisfies this assumption.
In addition, we make the following natural assumption on the
distribution of the attenuation coefficients (α1, . . . , αr) of the
channel operator:
Assumption (Uniformity): For any measurable subset E ∈
Sr−1C we have
P ((α1, . . . , αr) ∈ E) = Area(E)
Area(Sr−1C )
,
where Area denotes the unique up to scaling non-negative Borel
measure on Sr−1C which is invariant under all rotations of Cr, i.e.,
elements in SOr(C).
The last natural assumption that we make is the independence
of the noise and of the vector of attenuation coefficients of the
channel operator:
Assumption (Independence): The random sequences W ∈ H
and ~α = (α1, . . . , αr) ∈ Sr−1C are independent.
B. Objectives of the Paper
The main task of the digital radar system is to extract the chan-
nel parameters (τk, ωk), k = 1, ..., r, using S and R satisfying
(I-A.1). One of the most popular methods for channel estimation
is the pseudo-random (PR) method. In this note we describe the
PR method and analyze its performance.
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II. AMBIGUITY FUNCTION AND PSEUDO-RANDOM
METHOD
A classical method to estimate the channel parameters in (I-A.1)
is the pseudo-random method [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. It uses
two ingredients - the ambiguity function, and a pseudo-random
sequence.
A. Ambiguity Function
In order to reduce the noise component in (I-A.1), it is common
to use the ambiguity function that we are going to describe now.
We consider the time-frequency shift operators pi(τ , ω), τ , ω ∈
ZN , which act on f ∈ H by
[pi(τ , ω)f ] [n] = e(ωn) · f [n− τ ], n ∈ ZN (II-A.1)
The ambiguity function of two sequences f, g ∈ H is defined as
the N ×N matrix
A(f, g)[τ , ω] = 〈pi(τ , ω)f, g〉 , τ , ω ∈ ZN . (II-A.2)
Remark II-A.1 (Fast Computation of Ambiguity Function):
The restriction of the ambiguity function to a line in the time-
frequency plane, can be computed in O(N logN) arithmetic
operations using fast Fourier transform. For more details,
including explicit formulas—see Section V of [1]. Overall, we
can compute the entire ambiguity function in O(N2 logN)
operations.
B. Pseudo-Random Sequences
We say that a norm-one sequence ϕ ∈ H is B-pseudo-random,
B ∈ R—see Figure 1 for illustration—if for every (τ , ω) 6= (0, 0)
we have
|A(ϕ,ϕ)[τ , ω]| ≤ B/
√
N. (II-B.1)
There are several constructions of families of pseudo-random (PR)
sequences in the literature—see [2], [3] and references therein.
Fig. 1. Profile of A(ϕ,ϕ) for ϕ pseudo-random sequence.
C. Pseudo-Random (PR) Method
Consider a pseudo-random sequence ϕ, and assume for sim-
plicity that B = 1 in (II-B.1). Then we have
A(ϕ,H(ϕ))[τ , ω] (II-C.1)
=

α˜k +
∑
j 6=k
α˜j/
√
N, if (τ , ω) = (τk, ωk) , 1 ≤ k ≤ r;∑
j
α̂j/
√
N, otherwise,
where α˜j , α̂j , 1 ≤ j ≤ r, are certain multiples of the αj’s
by complex numbers of absolute value less or equal to one. In
particular, we can compute the time-frequency parameter (τk, ωk)
if the associated attenuation coefficient αk is sufficiently large,
i.e., it appears as a “peak” of A(ϕ,H(ϕ)).
Definition II-C.1 (δ-peak): Let δ > 0. We say that at v ∈ V
the ambiguity function of f and g has δ-peak, if
|A(f, g)[v]| ≥ N−1/2+δ.
Below we describe—see Figure 2—the PR method.
Fig. 2. Profile of A(S,R) for a pseudo-random sequence S, and a channel of
sparsity three.
Pseudo-Random Method
Input: Pseudo-random sequence S ∈ H, the echo R, and a
parameter δ > 0.
Output: Channel parameters.
Compute A(S,R) on V and return those time-frequency shifts at
which the δ-peaks occur.
We call the above computational scheme the PR method with
parameter δ.
Notice that the arithmetic complexity of the PR method is
O(N2 logN), using Remark II-A.1.
III. PERFORMANCE OF THE PR METHOD
First, we introduce two important quantities that measure the
performance of a detection scheme. These are the probability
of detection and the expected number of false targets. Then,
we formulate the main result of this note which provides a
quantitative statement about the performance of the PR method.
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Assume that we have r targets out of the N2 possible—see
Section I-A. Also, assume that some random data is associated
with these targets and influencing the performance of a detection
scheme. For example, in our setting the random data consists of
(i) the attenuation coefficients associated with the targets, and
(ii) the noise. In general, we model the randomness of the data
by associating a probability space (Ω, P ) to the set of targets.
For every ω in the space Ω we denote by Nt(ω) and Nf (ω),
the number of true and false targets detected by the scheme,
respectively. We define the probability of detection by
PD = P (a true target is detected) =
1
r
∫
Ω
Nt(ω)dP (ω),
and the expected number of false targets by
EFT = E(Nf ) =
∫
Ω
Nf (ω)dP (ω).
The main result of this note is the following:
Theorem III-.1 (Performance of PR method): Assume the
channel operator (I-A.2) satisfies the uniformity, square root
cancellation, and independence assumptions. Then for r ≤ N1−δ ,
where δ > 0, we have PD → 1, and EFT → 0, as N → ∞, for
the PR method with parameter δ/4.
Remark III-.2 (Rate of convergence): We suspect that the true
rate of convergence in PD → 1, and EFT → 0, as N → ∞, is
polynomial. In fact, our proof of Theorem III-.1 confirms that the
rate of convergence is at least polynomial.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The obtained estimates in Theorem III-.1 show that the PR
method is effective in terms of performance of detection, in the
regime r ≤ N1−δ , for δ > 0. We would like to note that if
r ≥ N1+ε, for ε > 0, then the performance of the PR method
deteriorates since the noise influence becomes dominant.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM III-.1
Before giving a formal proof, we provide a sketch. To detect the
parameters of the channel operator H , the PR method evaluates
the ambiguity function of R, and S at vk:
A(S,R)(vk) = αk +
∑
j 6=k
αj〈pi(vk)S, pi(vj)S〉+ 〈pi(vk)S,W〉.
Let us denote by ck =
∑
j 6=k αj〈pi(vk)S, pi(vj)S〉 the k-th cross
term, and by νk = 〈pi(vk)S,W〉 the k-th noise component. Then
we have
A(S,R)(vk) = αk + ck + νk. (V-.1)
The parameter vk is detectable by the PR method if the main
term αk is much larger than the k-th cross term ck, and the
noise component νk. For a random point on the unit sphere Sr−1C ,
by “concentration” most of its coordinates are of absolute value
approximately equal to 1/
√
r. Thus, if r ≤ N , the magnitude
of most of αk’s is greater than 1/
√
N . Another instance of the
concentration phenomenon guarantees that for most channels, the
magnitude of the cross term ck is smaller than 1/
√
N . Finally, the
square root cancellation assumption on the noise guarantees that
the magnitude of the noise term νk is much smaller than 1/
√
N .
We begin the formal proof of the theorem with auxiliary
lemmata. In Section VI we prove these statements.
Lemma V-.1 (Largeness of a slice): Let (α1, . . . , αr) be a
uniformly chosen point on Sr−1C , and fix k ∈ {1, . . . , r}. There
exists K > 0 (independent of r and k), such that for every ε > 0
we have
P (|αk| ≥ ε) ≥ 1−K
√
rε.
Lemma V-.2 (Intersectivity): Let E1, . . . , Er be events in a
probability space (Ω, P ), such that P (Ek) ≥ 1 − r−δ , k =
1, . . . , r, for some δ > 0. Then for the event
E = {ω ∈ Ω | ω is in at least n(r, δ) of Ek’s},
where
n(r, δ) = b(1− r−δ/2)rc,
we have
P (E) ≥ 1− r−δ/2.
Lemma V-.3 (Almost orthogonality): Let ` > 0, and let ~zj =
(zj1, . . . , z
j
r) ∈ Cr, j = 1, . . . , r`, be vectors satisfying
r∑
k=1
|zjk|2 ≤ C2
r
N
, for some C > 0.
Then for any δ > 0, there exists β > 0, such that for a uniformly
chosen random point ~α ∈ Sr−1C we have
P
 r`⋂
j=1
{
|〈~α, ~zj〉| ≤ Cr
δ
√
N
} ≥ 1− e−βr2δ .
Proof of Theorem III-.1.: Assume that r ≤ N1−δ , for
some δ > 0. Let R = HS + W , where S is a (B = 1)-
pseudo-random sequence in H, H is a channel of sparsity r with
uniformly distributed attenuation coefficients given by (I-A.2), and
W satisfies the square root cancellation assumption. We denote
vk = (τk, ωk), k = 1, . . . , r, and assume that at the receiver we
perform PR method with parameter δ/4.
(A) Proof of “PD → 1 as N →∞”.
We consider two cases.
Case 1. r ≥ logN .
Denote by Ek = {ω ∈ Ω | |αk(ω)| ≥ N−1/2+δ/3} for k =
1, . . . , r. Since r ≤ N1−δ by Lemma V-.1 there exists K > 0
such that we have
P (Ek) ≥ 1−Kr−
δ/6
1−δ .
Therefore, for sufficiently large N , we have
P (Ek) ≥ 1− r−
δ/7
1−δ .
Denote by
E = {ω ∈ Ω | ω is in at least (1− r− δ14(1−δ) )r of Ek’s}.
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By Lemma V-.2 we have
P (E) ≥ 1− r− δ14(1−δ) . (V-.2)
Since r ≤ N1−δ , we have r δ/51−δ ≤ Nδ/5. Therefore, by Lemma
V-.3, there exists β > 0 such that
P
 r⋂
k=1

∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=k
αj〈pi(vk)S, pi(vj)S〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ N− 12+ δ5


≥ 1− e−βr
2δ
5(1−δ)
. (V-.3)
It follows from (II-C.1), (V-.2), (V-.3), the square root cancella-
tion and independence assumptions, that with probability greater
or equal than 1−r− δ15(1−δ) , at least (1−r− δ14(1−δ) )r of the channel
parameters of H are detectable.
The latter implies that PD ≥ (1−r−
δ
15(1−δ) )(1−r− δ14(1−δ) ) for
N sufficiently large. Therefore we have PD → 1 as N →∞.
Case 2. r ≤ logN .
By Lemma V-.1, there exists K > 0 such that
P
(
r⋂
k=1
{
|αk| ≥ N−1/2+δ/3
})
≥ 1−K(logN)3/2N−1/2+δ/3.
By Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we have for all k = 1, . . . , r:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=k
αj〈pi(vk)S, pi(vj)S〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
r√
N
≤
√
logN
N
.
It follows from (II-C.1), square root cancellation assumption on
the noise, and the last two inequalities that for sufficiently large
N , all r channel parameters of the operator H are detectable with
probability greater or equal than 1 − N−1/2+δ/2. Therefore, for
sufficiently large N we have
PD ≥ 1−N−1/2+δ/2.
The latter implies that PD → 1 as N →∞.
(B) Proof of “EFT → 0 as N →∞”.
Case 1. r ≥ Nδ/3.
By Lemma V-.3, there exists β > 0 such that we have
P
 ⋂
v 6∈supp(H)
{∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
k=1
αk〈pi(v)S, pi(vk)S〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ N− 12+ δ5
}
≥ 1− e−βr
2δ
5(1−δ)
,
where supp(H) ⊂ V is the set of all channel parameters of H . It
follows from (II-C.1), the square root cancellation and indepen-
dence assumptions, and the last inequality that with probability
greater or equal than 1−e− β2 r
2δ
5(1−δ) the PR method will not detect
any wrong channel parameters. The latter implies that EFT → 0
as N →∞.
Case 2. r ≤ Nδ/3.
By Cauchy-Shwartz inequality we have that for every v 6∈
supp(H):∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
k=1
αk〈pi(v)S, pi(vk)S〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
r√
N
≤ N−1/2+δ/6.
It follows from (II-C.1), the square root cancellation assumption
on the noise, and the last inequality that there exists c > 0 such
that for N sufficiently large we have
P
 ⋂
v 6∈supp(H)
{
|〈pi(v)S,R〉| < N−1/2+δ/5
} ≥ 1− e−cN .
The latter implies that the PR method with parameter δ/4 satisfies
EFT → 0 as N →∞.
VI. PROOFS OF LEMMATA
Proof of Lemma V-.1: We identify the Borel probability
space on Sr−1C invariant under all rotations with the Borel
probability space S2r−1 of the real unit sphere invariant under
all rotations. Recall that
S2r−1 = {(x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . , xr, yr) ∈ R2r |
r∑
k=1
x2k + y
2
k = 1}.
Without loss of generality, it is enough to prove the statement for
k = 1. Let α1 = x1 + i · y1. We use the notation (Ω, P ) for the
probability space on S2r−1 invariant under all rotations in R2r.
For any ρ > 0, and any dimension n, we denote the real sphere
of radius ρ in Rn by Sn−1ρ :
Sn−1ρ = {(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Rn |
n∑
k=1
t2k = ρ
2}.
Let ε > 0. By Fubini’s theorem and using the homogeneity of the
Lebesgue measure we get
P (ω ∈ Ω | |x1(ω)| ≤ ε)
=
2
Area(S2r−11 )
·
∫ ε
0
Area(S2r−2√
1−t2)dt
= 2
Area(S2r−21 )
Area(S2r−11 )
∫ ε
0
(1− t2) 2r−22 dt.
It is well known that
Area(Sn−11 )
Area(Sn1 )
−→n→∞
√
n
2pi
.
Therefore, for r large enough we have
P (ω ∈ Ω | |x1(ω)| ≤ ε) ≤
√
2(2r − 1)
pi
∫ ε
0
(1− t2)r−1dt
≤
√
4r
pi
· ε.
Finally, the containment {ω ∈ Ω | |α1(ω)| ≤ ε} ⊂ {ω ∈
Ω | |x1(ω)| ≤ ε} together with last inequality imply the state-
ment of the lemma.
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Proof of Lemma V-.2: Denote by γ = P (E), and by fk =
χEk , k = 1, . . . , r. Then we have∫ r∑
k=1
fkdP ≥ r · (1− r−δ).
On the other hand, we have∫ r∑
k=1
fkdP =
∫
E
r∑
k=1
fkdP +
∫
Ec
r∑
k=1
fkdP
≤ γ · r + (1− γ) · (1− r−δ/2) · r.
The last inequality implies that
1− r−δ ≤ γ · r−δ/2 + (1− r−δ/2).
It implies
γ ≥ 1− r−δ/2.
Proof of Lemma V-.3: Let ε > 0. We proceed similarly to
the proof of Lemma V-.1. Since
{ω ∈ Ω | |α1(ω)| > ε}
⊂ {ω ∈ Ω | |x1(ω)| > ε/2} ∪ {ω ∈ Ω | |y1(ω)| > ε/2},
and
P (|x1| > ε/2) = P (|y1| > ε/2) = 2Area(S
2r−2
1 )
Area(S2r−11 )
∫ 1
ε/2
(1−t2)r−1 dt,
we conclude that there exists K > 0 such that
P (|α1| > ε) ≤ K
√
r
∫ 1
ε/2
(1− t2)r−1 dt.
If ε = r−1/2+δ , then there exists β′ > 0 such that
(1− (ε/2)2)r−1 ≤ e−β′r2δ .
This implies that there exists β′′ > 0 such that
P (|α1| ≥ r−1/2+δ) ≤ e−β′′r2δ .
By the rotation invariance of the Lebesgue measure on S2r−1, it
follows that there exists β > 0 such that for any set of directions
~θ1, . . . , ~θr` ∈ S2r−1 we have
P
 r`⋃
j=1
{
ω ∈ Ω | |〈~α(ω), ~θj〉| ≥ r−1/2+δ
}
≤ r` · e−β′′r2δ ≤ e−βr2δ .
The latter implies the statement of the lemma.
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